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Coke Oven Emissions: A Case Study of
Technology-Based Regulation
John D. Graham, David R. Holtgrave*
Introduction
The 101st Congress is considering three major proposals for
controlling hazardous air pollution: S.816, H.R.2585 and a proposal by
President Bush. 1 Each would require that maximum achievable
control technology [MACT] be applied to each major source of
emissions. The emissions remaining after MACT is applied (so called
"residual emissions") would be treated differently under the plans.
President Bush's plan calls for the Environmental Protection Agency
[EPA] to apply a discretionary "unreasonable risk" standard to residual
emissions whereas S.816 and H.R.2585 would eventually compel
major sources to comply with stringent numerical risk levels (so-called
"bright lines" of acceptable risk).
Although there are various interpretations of the MACT concept, the
general idea is to require each major source of emissions to achieve the
lowest level of emissions that has already been achieved by a major
source within the same group of industrial sources. Sometimes MACT
is interpreted differently for new and existing sources. Note that MACT
is not considered to be "technology forcing"; the idea is to proliferate the
* Professor Graham directs Harvard's Center on Risk Analysis and teaches in the
School of Public Health. His Ph.D. (public policy) is from Carnegie Mellon.
Professor Holtgrave is the interim Director of the Clinical Decision Making Program
at the University of Oklahoma and teaches in the Department of Family Medicine.
His Ph.D. (quantitative psychology) was earned at the University of Illinois.
1 S.816 was introduced on April 18, 1989; H.R. 2585 was introduced on June 8,
1989; the administration proposal was introduced as H.R. 3030 on July 27, 1989.
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application of known, demonstrated technology. However, the
legislative proposals would be "technology forcing" for those sources
whose residual emissions do not satisfy the "unreasonable" or "bright-
line" risk tests. For instance, the legislative proposals incorporate
health-based standards. The setting of the health-based standards
requires the establishment of a bright-line level of acceptable risk.
Polluters have a fixed period of time to reduce their output to a level
below the bright-line. If they lack the technological means to meet this
criterion, they are given five to ten years to develop the requisite
technology.
The coke production industry in the U.S. provides an informative
case study because it has been subjected to technology-based regulation
of fugitive emissions for over 30 years. This report examines how well
the approach has worked in the control of coke oven emissions and how
it might have worked better. Although the coke production process is
complex and unique, we believe it offers some general insights relevant
to today's legislative efforts to revise the Clean Air Act.
The Coke Production Process2
Coke is a vital and largely irreplaceable component of the iron and
steel production process. Coke is derived from coal. The major steps in
coke production are: (1) loading coal into the oven (the "charging" step),
(2) heating the coal until it becomes coke ("coking"), and (3) "pushing"
the coke out of the oven into cooling and transport cars. The oven
operates largely by reusing (burning) gases emitted by the hot coal
(hence the name, "by-product recovery"). Over 99% of U.S. coke
production makes use of "coke by-product recovery ovens."
2 This section is based in part on discussions in U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECIION AGENCY, COKE OVEN EMISSIONS FROM WET-COAL CHARGED BY-
PRODUCT COKE OVEN BATTERIES: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED
STANDARDS (1987).
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In a typical coke oven battery, a number of coke ovens are lined up
in a row. This row is called the battery. Each oven in the battery has
doors on top and on two sides (the other two sides abut neighboring
ovens). Above and to one end of the battery is a coal storage bin. On the
top of the battery is a movable "larry car" which is able to take coal from
the storage bin and drop it into specific coke ovens. On one side of the
battery is a movable "pusher car" which is able to push coke (made from
coal) out of the ovens and into a movable "coke car" or "quench car"
located on the other side of the ovens.
To be more precise, the first stage of coke oven operation involves
loading coal, by conveyor, into the coal storage bunker located above
and to one end of the oven battery. Depending on the chemical and
physical properties of the coke, the coal may be dried and preheated, or
simply used with its natural moisture content. The larry car takes small
loads of coal from the bunker and drops them into the coke ovens
comprising the battery. This dumping procedure requires that lids on top
of the ovens in the battery be automatically or manually opened and
shut. After the coal load is dumped into an oven, a leveler bar flattens
the pile of coal into a bed. This allows a space for the waste gas to
collect while the coal is being heated. The coal is heated from below by
a combustion gas system. The gas used is largely air and waste gas
taken from earlier cycles of coke production. Virtually all of the gas is
recovered and reused in the coke production process. This gas is
primarily composed of hydrogen and methane with water vapor, tar,
light oils, and heavy hydrocarbons (among other compounds) also
present. Steam jets force the gas trapped between the hot coal and the
oven top into a collecting gooseneck. Then the gas is sprayed with a
"flushing liquid" and cooled somewhat. After the tars, light oils,
ammonia, phenol, and hydrogen sulfide are taken from the gas, it is sent
back to the coke oven - this time into the side heating units.
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When the coal has been heated sufficiently (usually for 1530 hours
at around 1000 degrees Centigrade), doors on both sides of the oven are
opened. A pusher car then comes along and literally pushes the hot coke
out of the oven and into a quench car. The car takes the hot material to a
quenching tower. The coke is drenched with water and cooled for
transport and size screening. If the coal has been heated for a sufficient
length of time, this pushing operation poses little problem. However, if
the coal (not yet coke) is prematurely pushed from the oven, flames and
large quantities of volatile gases shoot out from the oven. This sort of
incident is called a "green push, "or "pushing a bomb. "It can only be
avoided and controlled through good brickwork, careful training of coke
oven workers, good work practices and maintenance of heating
systems.
As stated above, most of the gas in a coke oven is recycled and
reused. However, some emissions do escape during the charging,
coking and pushing phases. That is, topside lids, push side doors,
quench car side ("coke side") doors, and general cracks do leak to a
small extent. The amount of such "fugitive" emissions depends on
numerous factors such as the design, age and condition of the battery
and the operating and maintenance practices employed. Coke oven
emissions are a yellowish-brown gas containing upwards of 10,000
compounds, e.g., gases, vapors, and particulates. Several of these
constituents are known carcinogens. Especially problematic are
benzene, polycyclic organic matter, respirable particulate matter, and
coal tar pitch volatiles. The two major methods for measuring coke oven
emissions are (a) measuring the opacity of visible emissions, and (b)
measuring concentrations of BSFTPM (benzene soluble fraction of total
particulate matter). It is difficult, however, to correlate these two
measurement methods.
There are several methods of controlling fugitive coke oven
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emissions. Emission leaks during charging were controlled in the past
by using schemes for sequentially charging the ovens in a battery, and
by putting scrubbers on larry cars (these scrubbers ride under larry cars,
surround open topside lids during charging, and direct the gas to a
receptacle on the larry car). Topside leaks which occur while topside
lids are closed and the coal is heating are combatted through proper
maintenance and operating procedures. Several methods (e.g., coke
oven sheds, fume hoods, maintenance and operating procedures) exist
for controlling side door emissions, but the most common method is to
assure the tight sealing of the doors through various techniques such as
wet clay sealing (luting) and metal-to-metal sealing.
New model designs for entire coke ovens are also promising, but of
uncertain technological and economic feasibility. Such designs include
negative pressure ovens which trap all gases inside the oven by keeping
the oven pressure lower than the surrounding air pressure. Brand new
designs for coke oven component parts are also promising (these
include improvements in virtually every part of the coke oven). Progress
is also being made on cleaner methods of dry-coal charging (most
procedures now mix the bunker coal with some water), and better
methods for recycling the waste gases. In recent years, however, the
economics of new or redesigned coke ovens have been so unattractive
- in part because of environmental requirements - that very few
capital investments in new capacity have been made. Demand for coke
has been depressed over much of the last two decades, in concert with
the troubled state of the domestic steel industry. Only in the last few
years has the steel industry experienced a sustained upturn.
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The Health Effects of Coke Oven Emissions
Coke oven emissions can have a deleterious effect on human health.
Most of the regulatory action is based on cancer endpoints, and
therefore we focus on the evidence linking coke oven emissions to
excess human cancer risk.3
Coke oven emissions contain literally several thousand compounds,
several of which are known carcinogens and/or cocarcinogens
(including polycyclic organic matter from coal tar pitch volatiles, beta-
naphthylamine, benzene, arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromate, lead,
nickel subsulfide, nitric oxide and sulfur dioxide).4 However, most
regulatory attention has been paid to coal tar pitch volatiles. In
particular, the highly toxic benzene soluble organics fraction of the coal
tar pitch volatiles has been singled out for intensive study and standard
setting.5
Coal tar aerosols and air samples taken near coke ovens have been
shown to cause lung cancer in laboratory animals and to test positive in
mutagenicity tests on bacteria. Urine samples from nonsmoking coke
oven workers have also been deemed mutagenic by the Ames test. Coal
tar, which condenses from coke oven emissions, has been shown to
cause skin tumors in laboratory rodents.
3 For an overview of the limited literature on nonmalignant respiratory effects,
see U.S. Dept. of Labor, Exposure to Coke Ovens, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,748 (1976).
4 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTECTION AGENCY [hereafter EPA], CARCINOGEN
ASSESSMENT OF COKE OvEN EMISSIONS, FINAL REPORT OF OHEA, (1984).
5 Referred to as "BSO" (benzene soluble organics) or "BSTFM" (benzene soluble
fraction of total particulate matter).
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Table 16
Observed and Expected Deaths for
Selected Causes by Race, 1953 to 1961,
Among Men Employed in Coke Plants in 1953
Cause of Death Coke Plan Coke Oven Non-Oven
0 E SMR 0 E SMR 0 E SMR
All Causes (Total) 206 198.9 104 100 96.6 104 106 102.3 104
Respiratory Cancer 25 14.3 175t 20 7.5 267t 5 6.8 74
Digestive Cancer 16 14.8 108 4 6.5 62 12 8.3 45
All Causes (White) 114 121.1 94 25 31.4 80 89 89.7 99
Respiratory Cancer 4 7.5 53 3 1.9 - 1 5.7 18
Digestive Cancer 11 9.8 112 1 2.4 - 10 7.4 135
All Causes (Non-W) 92 77.8 118 75 65.2 115 17 12.6 135
Respiratory Cancer 21 6.8 309t 17 5.7 298t 4 1.1 -
Digestive Cancer 5 4.9 102 3 4.1 - 2 0.8 -
O = Observed Deaths; E = Expected Deaths; SMR = OE X 100
t indicates statistical significance at the 1 per cent level
indicates that SMR is not calculated when there are less than 5 deaths.
There is considerable epidemiological evidence to suggest that coke
oven emissions have been carcinogenic to workers. Results from one of
the oldest such studies are summarized above in Table 1.
In an overview of these studies, the International Agency for
Research on Cancer [IARC] stated that all but two of the
epidemiological cohort studies provided evidence of significantly raised
risk of lung cancer for coke oven workers - although one study
showed a deficit of lung cancer among coke oven workers. Comparison
6 J. W. Lloyd, Long-Term Mortality Study of Steelworkers: Part V - Respiratory
Cancer in Coke Plant Workers, 13 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 5 (1971).
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groups included both general population and non-oven coke production
worker samples. IARC states that the increase in lung cancer risk ranges
from threefold to sevenfold.7
EPA also reviewed the epidemiologic data and came to conclusions
similar to that of IARC. In the most methodologically-sound series of
epidemiological studies reviewed by EPA, Allegheny County top side
coke oven workers were found to have a risk of lung, trachea and
bronchus cancer seven times larger than non-oven coke production
workers. 8 The relative risk coefficient for side workers was 1.91,
i.e., 1.91 times as many deaths as expected. Allegheny County
workers, the top side and coke side relative risk rates were 3.47 and
2.31, respectively. This finding provided the first crude estimation of a
dose-response curve for cancer and coke oven emissions. It should be
stated, however, that even these exemplary studies suffer from lack of
adequate control for smoking status of the workers. While the control
groups of workers may have included some smokers, there is no data to
prove the comparability of the control group on this critical dimension.
EPA notes the epidemiologic studies conducted in Great Britain do
not find such large effects - some find no increased incidence of
inhalation pathway cancer. EPA states that these studies suffer from
methodological shortcomings, such as small sample sizes and
incomplete follow-up.9
In a very recent risk assessment, M.H. Dong and his coinvestigators
estimate age-specific rates of excess lung cancer for non-white coke
oven workers under the assumptions of a multistage model of
carcinogenesis. They find that (a) coke oven emissions act as a cancer
7 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON
CANCER, MONOGRAPH ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS
SUPPLEMENT 7 (1987).
8 Lloyd, supra note 6, at 53.
9 See supra note 4, at 98-110.
Graham and Holtgrave: Regulation of Coke Oven Emissions 251
initiator rather than a late stage promoter, (b) the number of stages in the
development of cancer from exposure to coke oven emissions is four
(this is not too far off from the commonly assumed number of six), and
(c) the lifetime risk for such workers might be as high as four in ten.10
On the basis of the epidemiological evidence, IARC has stated that
there is sufficient evidence to classify coke oven emissions as a known
human carcinogen. EPA has likewise placed "coke oven emissions" into
its highest category of "evidence for carcinogenesis."
EPA has gone further and estimated a unit risk factor for continuous
lifetime exposure to 1 microgram/cubic meter of BSO in the air. (The
unit risk factor gives the probability of a person developing cancer from
lifetime exposure to the stated concentration.) There is considerable
uncertainty about the EPA's estimate. EPA states that the proper range
for the estimate is from 1.30 X 10-8 to 1.26 X 10-3 , with the best point
estimate being 6.17 X 10-4 . EPA believes that the latter number is a
plausible upper-bound estimate.
Using this unit risk factor and various exposure modeling
techniques, EPA analysts have estimated how many residents are
exposed to coke oven emissions and how much extra risk of respiratory
cancer these exposures might generate. Overall, EPA estimates that coke
oven emissions are responsible for an additional seven cases of
respiratory cancer each year in the U.S., although some residents who
live close to such plants may experience very large individual risks.11
(This figure does not include any carcinogenic effects of occupational
exposures, which are addressed below.)
EPA estimates of cancer risk from exposure to coke oven emissions
10 Dong, Redmond, Mazumdar & Costantino, A Multistage Approach to the
Cohort Analysis of Lifetime Lung Cancer Risk Among Steelworkers Exposed to
Coke Oven Emissions, 128 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 860 (1988).
11 EPA, Coke Oven Emissions from Wet-Coal Charged By-Product Coke Oven
Batteries, 52 Fed. Reg. 13588;13594 (1987).
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should be treated with caution because they are based on some
disputable assumptions and questionable data. First, no epidemiological
evidence has established a direct link between community (residential)
exposure to coke oven emissions and excess rates of respiratory cancer
(although it might be difficult to detect such an effect even if it existed).
EPA risk estimates are based on extrapolation of epidemiological results
from the occupational setting to the general ambient environment. This
extrapolation introduces uncertainty because exposure levels in the
community are typically several orders of magnitude smaller than they
are in the coke oven environment. Furthermore, the chemical
composition of the pollutant mixture changes as emissions are
transported away from the ovens. EPA 'also assumes a linear dose-
response relationship at low levels, even though the available data are
also consistent with a nonlinear dose-response curve (which in this case
suggests a much smaller risk at low exposure levels). 12 Second,
cigarette smoking is not adequately addressed in the occupational
epidemiology, even though smoking could act as a confounder or
synergistic agent in producing the reported excess rates of respiratory
cancer among coke oven workers. Third, EPA's estimates of
community exposure to coke oven emissions are questionable. EPA
assumed in 1984 that 43 coke oven plants with 134 operating batteries
were in production; the most recent the American Iron and Steel Institute
[AISI] survey shows that there are only 30 coke plants with 84
operating batteries - the remainder are either in idle status or have been
permanently shut down. 13 Moreover, EPA's exposure modeling
makes numerous simplifying assumptions that tend to exaggerate risk
12 See Letter from Dr. Steven H. Lamm, Consultants in Epidemiology and
Occupational Health, Inc., to Dr. Todd Thorslund, EPA, (Aug. 5, 1983) (Critique of
EPA's risk assessment of coke oven emissions).
13 See comments of the American Iron and Steel Institute, EPA, Docket No. A-
79-15, August 6, 1987.
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(e.g., assuming that residents inhale the predicted outdoor
concentrations of coke oven emissions for 70 hours a day). Finally,
steel producers have performed validation studies that call into question
the accuracy of the EPA's Human Exposure Model for purposes of
projecting community exposure to coke oven emissions.14
In summary, coke oven emissions have been shown to cause cancer
in highly exposed worker populations. No direct evidence of
carcinogenic risk to residential populations has been reported. EPA risk
assessors predict that such a risk exists, although their estimates are
necessarily speculative.
Evolutions of Regulatory Programs
Coke oven emissions have been a subject of health concern for
decades. Both labor unions and environmental groups have been pro-
regulation actors, although not always in unison with each other.
Agencies at the local, state and federal levels have been active at various
times, although again not necessarily in a coordinated fashion.
Regulatory policy has been complicated by several key factors: concerns
about the health of both coke oven workers and community residents,
scientific uncertainty about the magnitude of the health risks (especially
in the case of community residents), genuine limitations of knowledge
about how to curtail such emissions (short of shutting down batteries),
technical disagreements about the feasibility and costs of various
proposed emission control strategies, concern for the financial viability
of the domestic steel industry generally and the plight of particular firms
on the brink of bankruptcy, and the high rate of unemployment in
communities that are economically dependent on the steel production
industry. The regulatory history that follows is intended to show how,
despite such factors, technology-based regulation led to some costly, yet
significant environmental improvements.
14 Id.
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The Allegheny County Health Department
In the 1960's, before the federal government or the states became
active in controlling coke oven emissions, the health department in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (the Pittsburgh area) became a
principle advocate of emission control policies.While many state health
departments in America have been mainly concerned with control of
infectious and communicable diseases, this department had
understandable reasons for being at the forefront of coke oven
emissions control. The largest coke plant in the world was operating in
the mill town of Clairton, just outside Pittsburgh. Another coke plant
was operating on the Monongahela River in close proximity to the
Squirrel Hill area of Pittsburgh, an upper class community that was a
principal home of Pittsburgh's liberal activists and academics.Grass-
roots concern about pollution in the Pittsburgh area also gave rise to
GASP (Group Against Smog and Pollution), one of the more ardent and
influential local environmental groups in the country. Professor Walter
Goldburg, now President of GASP, provided the following
commentary on coke oven emissions:15
"I believe that Pittsburgh has paid, and is paying, a very high price
for its failure to control emissions from its coke plants. Hillsides are
denuded by the pollution from the Clairton works, and property values
in various parts of Allegheny County are drastically decreased by the
stench and the dirt from these plants. The odor and haze that our coke
plants produce have always contributed to the difficulty in attracting top
notch professionals to the area, and this surely has had an adverse effect
on the economic welfare of the region."
Much of the key epidemiological research on the carcinogenic risks
of occupational exposure to coke oven emissions was performed at the
15 Personal Communication from Walter Goldburg (Mar. 4, 1989).
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University of Pittsburgh's School of Public Health, a professional
school with close links to the county health department. At the same
time, several domestic steel producers and the United Steel Workers of
America [USW] had their headquarters in Pittsburgh, including research
and medical staffs concerned with the health of steel workers in general
and coke oven workers in particular.
Regulatory action to control coke oven emissions evolved originally
from the power of the Allegheny County Commissioners (in
consultation with the health department) to deny operating permits for
coke oven batteries operating in the county. Later, the County
government was empowered to set specific emission standards for
manufacturing facilities such as coke batteries. Thus, it is important to
recognize that coke oven emissions in the Pittsburgh area were under
some regulatory control before federal agencies had interest in the
problem.
Occupational Controls16
In 1967, the American Conference of Industrial Hygienists
suggested that a Threshold Limit Value (TLV) for coke oven emissions
of 0.2 mg/m3 BSFTPM 17 per eight-hour working day be established.
This recommendation was adopted by the U.S. Secretary of Labor in
1969, prior to the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, when the 0.2 mg/m3 TLV was promulgated as a performance
standard under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act. The same
standard was later reaffirmed by the Secretary of Labor under the terms
of OSHA.
In 1971, AISI petitioned the Labor Secretary for a less stringent
standard, and USW petitioned for a more stringent standard. Both
16 For further discussion of matters summarized here, see supra note 3.
17 See supra, note 5.
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petitions were temporarily denied by the Labor Department because the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH] was
undertaking a large research program on coke oven emissions. In 1973,
NIOSH reported the findings of its research program. The conclusions
were twofold: (a) available data were inadequate to firmly establish the
adequacy of the 0.2 TLV, and (b) the most effective means of
controlling coke oven emissions were engineering controls and good
work practices.
During the 1973-1975 period, numerous OSHA citations were
issued against domestic steel producers for failure to comply with the
1971 performance standard. These citations were litigated before the
OSHA Review Commission and took several years to reach settlement.
Meanwhile, the USW began to raise coke oven emissions as a local
issue for collective bargaining. At the time, collective bargaining in steel
was governed by the Experimental Negotiating Agreement, which
forbade industry-wide strikes in return for guaranteed wage increases
and binding arbitration. Since strikes over "local" issues were still
permitted, the USW pressured for coke oven emissions control on a
plant-by-plant basis. In November, 1974 (two years prior to the final
OSHA standard), U.S. Steel Corporation and USW signed an
agreement covering coke oven emissions at the Clairton Works. The
agreement called for more coke oven workers, extra compensation for
specific jobs in coke ovens, and a program to reduce employee exposure
to coke oven emissions through engineering controls, improved work
practices, and increased use of respirators.
In 1974, OSHA had established - at the urging of the USW - the
Advisory Committee on Coke Ovens to reexamine coke oven emissions
and suggest control standards. Under the leadership of Dr. Eula
Bingham the Committee, in May 1975, recommended - after public
Hearings - specific engineering and work practice controls. The
Advisory Committee also suggested that coke oven workers be given
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periodic medical exams, transferred if necessary to non-oven jobs, and
guaranteed their job security and pay rate even if transferred. A minority
report of the Committee was signed by several industry members and
submitted to the Secretary of Labor. The minority report opposed
mandating specific engineering controls.
Three months later, OSHA proposed a standard which was
somewhat at odds with that recommended by the Advisory Committee.
The proposed standard allowed industry to use whatever engineering
controls they wished. Further, no time limit was placed on
implementation of the engineering controls, and employers were
permitted to protect workers with "personal protective devices"
(respirators) in the interim. Also, the proposed standard dropped the job
security and pay rate retention clauses from the Advisory Committee's
suggested medical examination procedure. Finally, the proposed
standard included a statement that the TLV be set at 0.3 mg/rn 3 of
"respirable particulate matter."
In late 1975 and early 1976, public hearings were held on the
proposed standard. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union
(OCAWU) and the USW criticized the proposed standard for its weak
time limits on controls and for its failure to retain the job and pay rate
security mechanism of the Advisory Committee's suggestions. AISI
charged that the standard could not realistically be met and would cost
the industry $1.28 billion per year. The Council on Wage and Price
Stability (CWPS), in agreement with OSHA, found that the annual costs
of implementation would be around $200 million per year. CWPS
disagreed with OSHA, however, on the number of lives saved per year
under the proposed standard. 18 OSHA maintained that all 240
employees likely to die from coke oven emissions exposure in a year
18 Council on Wage and Price Stability, Exposures to Coke Oven Emissions:
Proposed Standard, Executive Office of the President, May 11, 1976.
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(out of about 20,000 total employees) could be saved with the proposed
standard. CWPS stated that only 8 to 35 employees were likely to die,
although CWPS concurred that all might be saved with the proposed
standard. CWPS, concerned with inflation, stated that the lives saved
under the proposed standard would come at great cost - far in excess
of the $200,00 and $1.5 million "life valuations" then used by some
professional economists. Therefore, CWPS proposed that society
would be better off spending the money on cancer research, and
utilizing only respirators as control mechanisms.
After another round of public hearings, OSHA in October, 1979
promulgated a final standard. The standard was set at 0.15 mg/m3
BSFTPM per eight-hour working day. Some specific engineering and
work practice controls were mandated in the standard. Other detailed
regulations concerned (a) areas around the coke oven batteries covered
by the standard, (b) monitoring requirements for specific job
classifications, (c) protective respirator devices, (d) medical and
hygienic facilities and practices, and (e) a time limit for compliance
(January, 1980). Industry was required to undertake open-ended
research on new control techniques if the required controls proved
insufficient to meet the 0.15 mg/m3 standard. The job and pay rate
security clauses recommended by the advisory committee were not
promulgated.
The final OSHA standard was "technology-based" in two respects.
First, it went beyond a performance standard and mandated specific
engineering controls and work practices. Progress toward meeting the
1971 performance standard had been slow, thus buttressing the case for
design-oriented provisions. Second, the open-ended R&D mandate
meant that it was the industry's responsibility to discover new control
technologies, if necessary.
AISI and American Coke and Chemical Institute (ACCI) appealed to
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both the Secretary of Labor and the federal courts to delay the effective
date of the standard, but to no avail. In 1978, AISI and several steel
companies petitioned the federal judiciary to overturn OSHA's standard
on the grounds of insufficient rationale and infeasibility. The Third
Circuit found that OSHA and the Secretary of Labor acted properly in
determining that coke oven emissions were carcinogenic, and in
establishing the specific standard, time limit and control mechanisms.
However, the court ruled that OSHA and the Secretary of Labor had
gone too far when it called for open-ended research and development
programs. 19
Although the key provisions of the OSHA standard took effect in
January, 1980, it is difficult to quantify, precisely how effective the
OSHA standard has been in protecting worker health. The
implementation period was a financially difficult one for steel producers,
and many coke oven batteries were shut down for economic reasons.
Some states were active in enforcing their own coke oven emission
standards, and OSHA maintained a vigilant monitoring program for
emissions (citing and fining some companies for gross violations).
Mary Win-O'Brien, Assistant General Counsel of USW (and a former
OSHA employee) provided the following commentary on OSHA
enforcement efforts:20
The bulk of the cases were initiated right after the
standard became effective. The lead case was with the USX
at Fairless Hills where the ALJ upheld virtually all the
OSHA citations, 1978 CCH OSHD 23,052. While the
Review Commission reversed some of the items in 1982,
1982 CCH OSHD 26,297, by that time OSHA had inspected
a number of coke plants and reached detailed settlements.
OSHA set up, at the USWA's insistence, a group of
inspectors who were trained to inspect coke ovens.
19 Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dis. 448
U.S. 917 (1980).
20 Personal Communication from Mary Win-O'Brien (March 8, 1989)
(Commentary on OSHA enforcement efforts).
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Litigations took place at CF&I Steel and virtually all the
other companies. Inland Steel was the subject of a series of
settlement agreements that resulted in contempt citations in
the Court of Appeals for failure to comply with the
settlement agreement. That was the first time OSHA had
taken that approach to avoid the long delays in litigation
before the Review Commission. OSHA is a lot faster than
the EPA system and in terms of worker protection, the
agency did a good enforcement job from 1977 to 1985.
There have been virtually no recent coke oven citations.
In summary, OSHA's technology-oriented standards - while quite
costly - were effective in reducing worker exposures to coke oven
emissions. The standards were "specification oriented" in the sense that
they took what was successful at one battery and required it to be done
at other batteries. OSHA did not attempt to compel discovery of new
technologies. Vigorous enforcement of standards was a key to success.
Environmental Control Programs
Phase 1: Particulate Regulation
In the mid-1970's, two-thirds of the primary sources of emissions
from coke batteries were considered to be from charging (i.e., from
dropping coal from a larry car into a coke oven). The other one-third
came from pushing operations (i.e., from procedures during which a
push car forced the coke out into a quench car). Emissions from cracks
during coking were considered negligible contributors to the overall
problem. Today, such substantial progress has been made in controlling
emissions during charging that leaking lids, doors, and valves during
coking are now considered to be almost as important as the residual
charging emissions. 21 Progress during the last twenty years, although
substantial, has not been easy or inexpensive. A decade of struggle over
how best to control pushing emissions provides a vivid picture of how
21 Personal Communication from Earle Young, Vice President, American Iron and
Steel Institute (December 17, 1988).
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technology-forcing can go wrong.
Section 109 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197022 requires
the EPA to develop health-based National Ambient Air Quality
Standards [NAAQS] for particulates and other so-called "criteria"
pollutants. EPA's regulatory framework calls for each state to submit an
implementation plan with sufficient emission controls to bring
particulate concentration into compliance with the NAAQS. State and
local agencies are permitted, if they desire, to insist on stricter standards
than are necessary to meet EPA's NAAQS. Since coke ovens were a
significant source of particulate emissions in some "nonattainment"
regions of the country, EPA and state officials began in the 1972-75
period to investigate the feasibility of curbing such emissions. By the
end of that period, EPA and state officials proposed to require the
control of coke oven "pushing emissions."
Subsequent negotiations over consent decrees with the industry
became intense during 1975-76; EPA and state officials insisted that
pushing emissions had to be controlled - especially in nonattainment
regions. Technical experts in the steel industry responded that they
knew of no viable techniques for controlling these emissions. They
argued further that a major new research, development and testing
program was necessary if pushing emissions were to be effectively
controlled.
In light of the regulatory interest in pushing emissions, commercial
suppliers of pollution control equipment began to propose various
solutions, which were generally applications of control systems that had
been used in other manufacturing processes or in other facts of the steel
production process. A variety of companies proposed specific technical
solutions. Each of the solutions shared two components: some type of
enclosure that would contain pushing emissions and some type of gas
22 84 Stat. 1679; codified, with amendments, at 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
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cleaning device (stationary or mobile).
In negotiations with individual steel companies, various regulatory
agencies (local, state and federal) urged specific control systems,
relating proposed reductions to claims of enterprising suppliers. Some
industry negotiators felt that some officials appeared to be favoring - at
least implicitly - Envirotech's aeronautical mobile scrubber (the
"Chemico Car"). In any event, the consent decree process resulted in the
majority of the industry's coke batteries being equipped with
Envirotech's system. Installing the system cost roughly $5 million per
battery, or over $250 million in capital investment on an industry-wide
basis.23
Soon after the Chemico Cars were installed, it became apparent that
their performance was inadequate and their degree of reliability was
unacceptable. Although the systems reduced emissions significantly
relative to uncontrolled levels, they did not comply with the particulate
standards in state implementation plans.2 4 Steel industry officials, who
felt they had been virtually coerced to purchase the systems, complained
both to regulators for relief and to the suppliers about misleading
representations about performance and major steel producers filed
substantial lawsuits against Envirotech, which took over five years to
settle. Millions of dollars were expended in litigation and in efforts to
upgrade the system's performance. Although the details of the
settlements are confidential, substantial compensation was provided to
the major steel producers.25
The fundamental technical problem was that the Envirotech
23 Personal communication from Theodore Dinsmore, Gaston, Snow, Ely and
Bartlett (counsel to an equipment supplier), December, 1988.
Also, personal communication from Phil Masciantonio, Vice President, USX,
to authors, April 24, 1989. Although there had been earlier discussions, during a day
long meeting at Harvard, virtually all apsects of prior discussions were rehashed.
24 Masciantonio, supra.
25 Id.
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scrubbers were designed for relatively benign metallurgical furnace
applications. They had never been tested for coke oven applications. 26
Coke batteries are a much harsher environment for such equipment due
to factors such as wide fluctuations in temperature and variations in
atmospheric conditions. The performance of the systems also varied
depending upon the age and condition of the battery, the quality of
scrubber maintenance programs, and the quality of the coking job.
Although some progress was made in improving the performance and
reliability of the Envirotech system, it is no longer considered the
control technology of choice. At least one major steel company has
recently reached an agreement with the EPA that calls for putting the
Envirotech system out of service while beginning construction of an
entirely new system to control pushing emissions.27
In summary, technology-based regulation does not always work -
especially when regulators try to "leapfrog" technological innovation
(so-called "technology-forcing"). In this case, a technology-forcing
strategy proved to be both costly and much less effective than regulators
had hoped. A phase-in period that allowed for technological
experimentation might have been more successful in the long run.
Alternatively, regulators might have settled for best available technology
and encouraged R&D. Whether these options would have yielded fuller,
or more timely, control of emissions is, of course, speculative.
Phase 2: Hazardous Air Pollution Regulation
Aside from their contribution to particulate pollution, coke oven
emissions contain numerous toxic constituents that are a potential threat
to human health. As a result, the EPA listed coke oven emissions as a
hazardous air pollutant in 1984.28 A nationwide control standard (i.e.,
26 Dinsmore, supra note 23; also personal communication from Thomas C.
Graham, Vice Chairman, USX December, 1988.
27 Supra note 23.
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a National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants, or
NESHAP) was proposed in April, 1987 pursuant to Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.29 The proposed control standards
cover charging operations and coking leaks from topside lids, side
doors, gas offtake systems, and waste gas collection mains.
Due to the fugitive nature of BSFTPM, the EPA prefers not to
measure concentrations of that particulate matter. Rather, the EPA relies
on visible emissions standards in its regulatory efforts. This
measurement methodology involves specifying the percentage of doors
leaking during the coking process and the number of seconds emissions
are visible during the charging process.
The EPA studied several regulatory options and selected the
following for its proposal: ten PLD (percent leaking oven doors), three
PLL (percent leaking lids), six PLO (percent leaking offtakes), and
sixteen seconds of visible emissions per charge. The proposed standard
is estimated to reduce the number of nonoccupational respiratory cancers
per year due to coke oven emissions from 6.9 to 4.0 and the risk to the
maximally exposed individual from 3.4 X 10-2 to 1.4 X 10-2.30 The
standard is estimated to cost $19.3 million per year. This option was
selected over a more stringent proposal that EPA judged to be
technologically and economically infeasible. Another option calling for
10 PLD, 3 PLL, 10 PLO, and 25 seconds per charge would have
reduced the number of cancers per year from 6.9 to 4.3 at a cost of $7
million per year to industry. It was also rejected in favor of the more
stringent standard.3 1
EPA's current regulatory proposal is likely to undergo a complete
28 49 Fed. Reg. 36560 (1984).
29 84 Stat. 1685; codified, with subsequent amendments, at 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
30 The uncertainties associated with these risk estimates are discussed, supra, in
the section, THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF COKE OVEN EMMSONS.
31 52 Fed. Reg 13586-13606 (1087).
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overhaul before final promulgation due to the Vinyl Chloride case.3 2
The statutory language in Section 112 calls for EPA to set NESHAP that
protect the public health with an ample margin of safety. In the Vinyl
Chloride case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled en
banc that this means that EPA must: (a) determine a safe emissions
level, and (b) promulgate an emissions standard at a level which protects
the public health with an ample margin of safety [i.e., the promulgated
standard may not be less stringent than the safe emissions level
determined in (a)]. Cost and feasibility issues may be considered with
regard to the latter, but not the former step. The first NESHAP to be
promulgated under the Vinyl Chloride ruling will be that for benzene;
next will come coke oven emissions.
Compared to Phase 1 particulate regulations, the EPA's efforts to
control coke oven emissions as a hazardous air pollutant make more
direct allowances for issues of cost and technical feasibility. Although
the safe emissions level is to be set based on health considerations (as
was the NAAQS), the emissions standard may have a very narrow
margin of safety if the technology needed to reach the safe emissions
level is unreasonably expensive or is nonexistent. Therefore, this type
of regulation allows for cost-effectiveness considerations to be directly
incorporated into standard setting once the safe emissions level is met.
Coordinating Technology-Based Standards
Lave and Leonard provide a discussion of the contradictions
between OSHA and EPA regulatory efforts on coke ovens. They begin
by noting the different emissions measurement strategies used by OSHA
and the EPA, and go on to claim that the EPA regulations require
nothing above and beyond that required by OSHA. "If OSHA had
32 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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enforced its own regulation, the EPA would not have found sufficient
hazard to justify additional regulation., 33
Lave and Leonard argue that EPA and OSHA need to better
coordinate their efforts. Coke oven workers donning respirators cut
down on their own exposure, but not on the exposure to the community
at large. Early suggestions to construct sheds around coke production
facilities might have protected neighborhood residents from exposure to
coke oven emissions, but simultaneously might have increased worker
exposures. Coke oven emissions must be regulated with occupational
and nonoccupational exposures in mind; if this is not done, argue Lave
and Leonard, then money, time, effort and public health will be
squandered in an inefficient regulatory enterprise.
Our historical review suggests that the coordination problem in
technology-based regulation is even more complex than Lave and
Leonard suggest. Coke producers must deal with numerous institutional
actors with interests in controlling coke oven emissions: (1) the USW
- both local and international, (2) the EPA - both regional and
national, (3) OSHA - both rule making and enforcement officials, (4)
state environmental agencies - acting either in response to EPA
requirements or in response to their own desires; and (5) local health
departments such as the one in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
Although in some cases the various actors make good faith efforts to
coordinate their activities, they often act independently of each other.
There can sometimes be political or bureaucratic incentives to not
coordinate with other agencies, for example if an actor may be seeking
the credit for cleaning up coke oven emissions.
Whether coke oven emissions might have been regulated more
swiftly, comprehensively, and efficiently if the various agencies had a
33 L. Lave & B. Leonard, Regulating Coke Oven Emissions in RISK ASSESSMENT
OF ENViRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS: A TEXT BOOK OF CASE STUDIES
560 (J. Pausenback ed. 1988).
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different set of relationships is an issue Congress could consider.
Compared to present relationships, for example, Congress could
explicitly direct OSHA and EPA to develop and jointly sign off on any
technology-based standard that affects both occupational environmental
health. Or, the regulatory review office within 0MB could be directed to
insist on formal coordination in its review of regulatory proposals. Or,
Congress might call for limited federal preemption of state and local
authority to regulate hazardous air pollutants, once technology-based
standards at the federal level have been established. Such preemption
might be in effect for, say, five years after a major federal rule is
promulgated. Arguably, while retaining the States' powerto set stricter
standards in the long run, a limited preemption doctrine might foster
more coherent regulatory programs and lead to a more cooperative
posture on the part of regulated industries. It is difficult to believe that
these alternative arrangements could have taken any longer to achieve
control improvements than the present fragmentary system has taken.
Lessons From the Coke Oven Experience
Since the early 1900's dramatic progress has been made in the
control of coke oven emissions. The first big step was the transition to
contemporary by-product coke ovens - a relatively contained type of
system - from the earlier "beehive" technology, a completely
uncontrolled coke production process. During the last thirty years,
further progress has been made in controlling fugitive emissions from
by-product ovens. In the 1960's and 1970's, human exposures to
emissions from the "charging" and "pushing" operations were reduced
through improvements in work practices, technological advances, and
wider use of respirators in the workplace. These improvements were
largely the result of OSHA regulation and EPA's control of coke oven
emissions as particulate matter (see sections above). In the 1980's
fugitive emissions from doors and valves during coking have been a
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principal concern of regulatory officials, and a variety of control
programs are being considered and implemented. EPA began to exert
control over coke oven emissions as a hazardous air pollutant in 1984;
the long process from listing a hazardous air pollutant to the
promulgating of a NESHAP is still unfolding in the case of coke oven
emissions.
The development of technology-based regulations by local, state and
federal agencies has been an important factor in the emission control
improvements made since the advent of by-product coke ovens. Armed
with epidemiological studies of excess cancer among coke oven workers
and supportive toxicological evidence from the laboratory, regulatory
officials have set specific standards that are intended to curb risks to
worker and community health. Examples of these regulatory efforts
include the (above-reviewed) actions of the Allegheny County Health
Department, OSHA and EPA. For the most part, these standards have
survived intensive political, economic and judicial scrutiny. This
scrutiny has come in the form of public debate, negotiated consent
decrees and Appellate rulings. Compliance with these standards has
been somewhat uneven due to the severe financial difficulties within the
domestic steel industry. All parties agree that on the whole, though,
substantial progress has been made even though it is not possible to
exactly quantify the magnitude of health benefits. More progress is
anticipated in the years ahead due to EPA and state programs and
USW's continuing efforts to enforce the OSHA standard.
As Congress considers a legislative strategy aimed at controlling
200-odd hazardous air pollutants emitted throughout America's
industrial economy, it is important to recognize what the potential
problems with technology-based regulation are, what adverse societal
consequences they cause, and how - where possible - the problems
can be avoided. This is especially important because the current standard
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setting for hazardous air pollutants requires the setting of a safe
emissions level which is blind to cost and feasibility issues; this is true
even though the setting of the margin of safety around the safe
emissions level can consider cost and technological feasibility.
Technology-forcing regulation, by its very nature, induces tension
between regulators and regulatees. Government, concerned with health
protection, is put in the position of saying, "yes, more emission control
is essential"; while regulatees, concerned with costs, tend to say, "no,
we've done all we can." The stakes in the game may include the public
health and the economic viability of particular industries. Over time, the
process can lead to cynicism and mistrust among key people in
government and industry.
Many believe the adversarial culture works to the detriment of
environmental progress because it undermines the mutual respect that is
necessary to achieve successful technical collaborations on complex
environmental control problems. They argue that as long as EPA
emphasizes application of proven technology, and avoids a
"technology-forcing" posture, the adversarial culture can be managed
successfully. Environmentalists, among other, argue that public health
is an overriding value; they contend that any lack of adequate control
technology reflects industry's disregard for public health and its failure
to invest in needed research and development of control technology. In
this view, technology-forcing requirements are the price of violating
health-based standards.
The coke ovens experience suggests that forcing technology can lead
to less effective than anticipated control efforts, at great expense. The
Chemico car is a case in point. Congress appears to recognize this point,
since MACT is typically defined in a way that permits consideration of
costs. Given the globalization of the world's industrial economy, greater
efforts could be made to avoid costly, industry-wide experiments with
I RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 243 [Summer 1990]
untested, emission control equipment. The case study reveals how the
domestic steel industry - despite intense import competition and
deteriorating steel-making facilities - expended $250 million on mobile
scrubbing equipment that was not yet ready to be applied to pushing
emissions in coke batteries.
Arguably, allowing enough time for pilot testing at several plants
before industry-wide compliance was demanded would have provided
operating experience on which requirements could have been based.
Indeed, rigorous quasi-experiments can be conducted in the field the
efficacy of new control devices. Even a single plant can be used to
conduct an interrupted time-series experiment on a new device's field-
worthiness. In the long run, gradual introduction of innovative
technologies forced by the need to meet standards may achieve more
successful emission control at lower economic cost than an industry-
wide standard with tight deadlines. A more "technology-inducing"
approach - tax breaks for innovators and participants in field
experiments, or waivers for firms that achieve voluntary progress ahead
of schedule - might also facilitate a less adversarial relationship
between industry and government, thus minimizing the collaborative
problem cited earlier.
In hindsight, at least, it appears that a portion of the significant
regulatory and industrial resources expended in the coke ovens
experience resulted in technological controls that failed to meet
expectations. While such investments may be worthwhile in certain
cases, Congress might consider allowing regulators some flexibility to
authorize and encourage pilot testing, and to exempt particular sources
from such standards when it can be demonstrated that health risks are
negligible and that the costs to society will be grossly disproportionate
to the expected health or environmental benefits. A strict cost/benefit test
is not appropriate because it would engender additional delays and
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"paralysis of analysis." However, based on the coke ovens experience,
one might conclude that a "technology-based" approach to clean air
legislation needs to be accompanied with some regulatory discretion to
consider the magnitude of benefits and costs to be expected from
regulation - often called an "unreasonable risk" approach.
Congress may also wish to consider whether it makes sense to have
numerous regulatory offices tackling the same emissions problem. The
coke ovens experience raises the question of whether a more
coordinated regulatory approach might have achieved the same - or
even a greater - degree of emission control at a lower societal cost.
Overly ambitious technology-based standards can divert scarce capital
from more effective control strategies and from promising R&D
programs. Industry's need for a predictable regulatory environment is
especially great when expensive technology-based rules are to be
applied to capital-intensive firms that face concerted import competition.
Once the federal government applies a technology-based standard, a
period of preemption could be observed by-all regulatory actors before
yet another round of regulation is considered - as for example, Clean
Water Act permits imply no more stringent controls during the period of
permit, except in unique situations.
Requiring maximum achievable control technology appears to be a
pragmatic approach to reducing emissions of hazardous air pollutants.
The control of the residual emissions is a more difficult challenge. While
some criticize the treatment of residual emissions in the Bush
Administration's plan as vague and discretionary, others argue that the
"bright lines" contained in S.816 and H.R.2585 may represent an
impractical form of "technology-forcing." The coke ovens experience
suggests that forcing technology beyond what is demonstrated and
achieved in practice can lead to costly and possibly less effective control
efforts, while a more planned approach to testing and implementation
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might have achieved superior emission control results at equal or lower
cost to society. Regardless of what legislative plan is enacted, industries
that expect to have significant residual emissions should launch major
programs of research and development to discover superior emission
control strategies.
